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ABSTRACT
Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) condition makes social 
choice depend only on personal rather than interpersonal comparisons of relevant 
social states, and so leads to dictatorship. Instead, a new “independence of irrele­
vant interpersonal comparisons” (IIIC) condition allows anonymous Paretian social 
welfare functionals such as maximin and Sen’s “leximin,” even with an unrestricted 
preference domain. But when probability mixtures of social states are considered, 
even IIIC may not allow escape from Arrow’s impossibility theorem for individuals’ 
(ex-ante) expected utilities. Modifying IIIC to permit dependence on interpersonal 
comparisons of relevant probability mixtures allows Vickrey-Harsanyi utilitarian­
ism.





















































































































































































Thus, if  we wish to go beyond the comparisons that are possible using 
only the [Pareto] principle of the new welfare economics, the issue is 
not whether we can do so without making interpersonal comparisons 
of satisfactions. It is rather, what sorts of interpersonal comparisons 
are we willing to make. Unless the comparisons allowed by Arrow’s 
Condition S [independence of irrelevant alternatives] could be shown to 
have some ethical priority, there seems to be no reason for confining 
consideration to this group.
— H ildreth  (1953, p. 91)
1. Introduction
It is becoming widely acknowledged that interpersonal comparisons of utility 
are likely to provide the only ethically satisfactory escape from Arrow’s (1950, 
1963, 1983) impossibility theorem. Their incorporation into social choice theory, 
however, requires some appropriate reformulation of Arrow’s independence of ir­
relevant alternatives (IIA) condition.
An Arrow social welfare function (ASWF) makes the social ordering depend 
upon individual preference orderings. Sen (1970a, 1970b, 1977, 1982) showed how 
interpersonal comparisons of utility could be included in formal social choice theory 
by making the social ordering depend upon individuals’ utility functions via a 
social welfare functional (SWFL). Unlike a profile of preference orderings, a profile 
of utility functions can incorporate various kinds of interpersonal comparisons, 
such as comparisons of utility levels, or of utility differences, or both. This became 
clear in the ensuing work by d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Sen (1977), Roberts 
(1980b), Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1984), d’Aspremont (1985) and 
others.
This body of work has left two major issues unresolved, or at last unsatis­
factorily resolved. The first is the interpretation of the interpersonal comparisons 
themselves. This has left room for much confusion in the literature on interpersonal 




























































































and many others. Elsewhere (Hammond, 1990) I have discussed the idea that 
interpersonal comparisons represent the relative ethical desirability of individuals 
with different personal types or characteristics, as well as of social states. In fact, 
I postulate the existence of a fundamental preference ordering (cf. Harsanyi, 1955, 
Tinbergen, 1957, Rawls, 1959, 1971, and Kolm, 1972) on the space of all personal 
consequences — which are pairs consisting of social states and personal charac­
teristics. This postulate leads to interpersonal comparisons of utility levels, as 
explained further in Section 2 below. When probability mixtures of personal con­
sequences are also considered and the maximization of the expected value of some 
von Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare function is assumed, the same postulate 
also leads to interpersonal comparisons of utility units, as explained in Section 8 
below.
Arrow’s IIA requires the social choice from any set of social states Z  to de­
pend only on individuals’ preferences restricted to Z,  and so excludes interpersonal 
comparisons. So the second issue is how to amend Arrow’s IIA condition in order 
to allow interpersonal comparisons and, in particular, how to amend it without 
having it lose all its natural appeal, which elsewhere I have even sought to reinforce 
(Hammond, 1977, 1986). For SWFL’s, a natural adaptation of IIA is to make the 
social ordering over any set depend only on individuals’ utility functions restricted 
to that set, as in d’Aspremont and Gevers (1977), Sen (1977), Roberts (1980b), etc. 
One may call this condition “independence of irrelevant utilities” (IIU), since the 
“relevant utilities” are those of the “relevant alternatives” in Arrow’s sense. The 
IIU condition, however, rather obviously allows dependence on irrelevant alterna­
tives once interpersonal comparisons are based on individuals’ own preferences for 
different personal characteristics. For, when personal characteristics and prefer­
ences are fixed, IIA requires us to ignore all the information which preferences for 
personal characteristics provide, and so interpersonal comparisons cannot affect 
social choice after all.
This observation prompts consideration of what really is a “relevant alter­




























































































Strasnick (1977) in the past. In particular, are relevant alternatives social states, 
as in Arrow’s work, or are they perhaps personal consequences, as might be thought 
appropriate for ethical decisions? More specifically, what are relevant preferences 
or comparisons? Are they individual preferences or personal comparisons over 
relevant social states, as in Arrow? Or are they fundamental preferences or inter­
personal comparisons over relevant personal consequences?
This paper will consider the implications of allowing some particular inter­
personal comparisons to become relevant. Section 2 sets out a basic framework for 
social choice theory which differs somewhat from the standard framework. Ethical 
views will be allowed to vary, so that the interpersonal comparisons which they 
generate can change. Section 3 considers the form which Arrow social welfare 
functions take within this new framework. Then Section 4 reconsiders Arrow’s 
IIA condition when ethical views are allowed to vary and formulates a slightly 
more powerful “independence of irrelevant personal comparisons” (1IPC) condi­
tion. This leads to a strengthened form of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in which 
not even the dictator’s identity depends on variable ethical views.
Section 5 formulates the first new independence condition which allows inter­
personal comparisons to influence the social ordering. It is called “independence 
of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons” (IIIC). The same Section 5 also sets out 
an associated independence condition for a fixed society. Section 6 relates this to 
the independence condition for “generalized social welfare functions” of Hammond 
(1976). If individuals’ welfare orderings can be represented by utility functions, 
then this reduces to the IIU condition discussed above.
Generalized social welfare functions make no attempt to allow for the special 
structure of expected utility maximizing preferences for random consequences. 
Accordingly, Section 7 extends the framework of Sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 in order 
to allow risk. In fact Section 7 allows general preferences for risky consequences, 
and argues that nothing new emerges. In Section 8, however, it is assumed that 
both social and individual welfare orderings have expected utility representations. 




























































































non-negatively weighted sum of individual welfare functions (cf. Harsanyi, 1955).
In this framework of expected utility maximization, it is natural to extend 
both the IIPC condition of Section 4 and the IIIC condition of Section 5 to sets 
of risky consequences. Yet, under the assumption of a sufficiently rich domain of 
both personal characteristics and ethical views, Section 9 shows that even IIIC 
only allows dictatorial preferences. Accordingly, Sections 10 and 11 formulate two 
“independence of irrelevant (inter)personal comparisons of mixtures” conditions 
(IIPCM and IIICM). In Section 10 it is shown how IIICM does allow Vickrey- 
Harsanyi utilitarianism. In fact, it allows the maximization of an unweighted 
sum of fundamental (expected) utilities. This is the classical utilitarian crite­
rion, somewhat reinterpreted, which I have sought to defend in Hammond (1987, 
1988, 1990). Section 11 shows how interpersonal comparisons are essential. Just 
cardinalizing utilities is not enough because, without interpersonal comparisons, 
IIPCM is equivalent to IIPC. This accords with the earlier impossibility results 
for non-comparable cardinal utilities due to Sen (1970a) and Osborne (1976).
Section 12 is a brief concluding summary.
2. Social States, Personal Consequences and Fundamental Preferences
Let the membership of a society — the fixed finite set of individuals — be 
M , with at least two members. Each member i 6 M  has a personal characteristic 
0i in the set 0  of all possible personal characteristics. Each 0 6 0  determines 
everything relevant to evaluating the welfare of all 0-persons — their preferences, 
needs, etc. A society is a profile 0M =  (0 )̂igM of personal characteristics, one for 
each individual i 6 M .
Unlike most social choice theory, it will be convenient here to think of ethical 
views as being variable. The reason is that social choice rules will be considered 
which depend upon variable interpersonal comparisons. Thus e, e' will denote 
possible ethical views or ethics, in the form of parameters affecting both social 
and individual preference orderings, including interpersonal comparisons, and E  




























































































Arrow (1963) takes both the society 8M and the ethic e as given, not influenced 
by the social choice. There is a set X  of at least three social states. As explained in 
the introduction, I shall allow choices to affect personal characteristics in order to 
have interpersonal comparisons (or, more exactly, comparisons between personal 
characteristics rather than between persons). So the choice space of conceivable 
consequences (cf. Hammond, 1986, 1987) is expanded from X  to the product space 
X  x ©M whose members are pairs ( x ,6M) consisting of social states x 6 X  and 
of societies 6M £ QM.
For any set S  of possible social or individual states, let 'JZ(S) denote the set 
of all logically possible preference orderings over S. It will then be assumed that 
there is a mapping p : E  TZ(X x 0 M) which, for every possible ethic e £ E,  
determines the social welfare ordering R  =  p(e) on X  X QM as a function of e.
Of course, the preference ordering p(e) is meant to be able to determine on 
its own the appropriate mode of behaviour in any ethical decision problem. The 
task of social choice theory, however, is to construct such an ordering from infor­
mation about individual preferences or welfare orderings, as well as interpersonal 
comparisons. In this sense, social choice theory is a study of how to construct 
individualistic ethical decision rules.
Interpersonal comparisons are ethical preferences regarding the personal char­
acteristic 9 as well as the social state x. Thus I shall assume that there is a mapping 
p : E  >-> R ( X  x 0 )  which, for every possible ethic e £ E,  determines the funda­
mental (interpersonal) welfare ordering R  =  /5(e) on the space X  X 0  of personal 
consequences — i.e., on combinations (x, 9) of social states together with personal 
characteristics. Indeed, when R  = p(e), one can interpret the strict preference 
statement (x , 8) P  (y,i)) as signifying that, according to the ethic e, it is prefer­
able for society to have a 0-person in social state x rather than an //-person in 
social state y.
Following Harsanyi (1955) and Kolm (1972), I shall consider only a single ethic 
e £ E  which applies to all persons, and is independent of i. This is in contrast to 




























































































members of a society will not be considered in this paper.
Finally, the social welfare ordering p(e) is meant to be based upon individual 
welfare. It should therefore be true that there is a social welfare function with 
ordinal interpersonal comparisons (or SWF) <j>: 1Z(X x 0 )  e-> 1Z(X x 0 M) which 
determines the social welfare ordering p(e) £ TZ(X x 0 M) as a function of the 
fundamental welfare ordering p(e) £ 7Z(X  x 0 ) . For this to be true for every ethic 
e 6 E  requires that p(e) = f[p(ej\. The following commutative function diagram, 
in which l denotes the identity mapping, illustrates this.
R [ X  x 0 )  
P 
E
R ( X  x 0 )
<t>
K ( X  x 0 M)
In most of what follows, I shall also assume that the (weak) Pareto condition 
(P) is satisfied, in the sense that when R  = /5(e) is the fundamental ordering, and 
when R  = p(e) =  4>{R) is the social ordering, then
(M O  p  (y ,vi)  (ail i e M ) = >  (x ,e M) p  (y , v M).
Thus, if every individual i £ M  is made better off as a result of changing both the 
social state and personal characteristics, then that change is to be preferred.
3. Arrow Social Welfare Functions
For each ethic e £ E  and each fixed society 9M £ QM, the social welfare 
ordering R  = p(e) on X  x 0 M induces an obvious restricted ordering p(a)xx[eM) 
on the subset X  x {6M}. In turn, this generates an ordering R (6M, e) on the space 
of social states X  given by
x R(9M, e ) y  ^  ( x , 6M) p(e) ( y ,6M).
Arrow’s original social choice problem can be regarded as how to determine 




























































































of the “individual values” or preferences in each society 8M. Thus, in a society 
0M, and given both the ethic e £ f  and the fundamental interpersonal ordering 
R  = /3(e) on X  X 0 , for each individual i £ M  there is an obvious induced restricted 
ordering p(e)xx{«,} on the subset X  x {#/}. This generates in turn an individual 
welfare ordering Ri(9i, e) on X , depending on the personal characteristic which 
is given by
x R , ( 0 i , e ) y  (x,9i) p(e) (y,9i).
Actually, for any 9 £ 0  and the ordering R i(9 ,e ) is independent of i. But
the notation Ri(9i,e) seems clearer than just R(0i,e) ,  since it emphasizes that 
is the welfare ordering for individual i.
Notice that each individual’s welfare ordering !?,(#;, e) depends in general 
upon the ethic e. In neoclassical welfare economics, it is usual to postulate “con­
sumer sovereignty”, whereby f?,(0,, e) is the preference ordering that determines 
i ’s behaviour when his type is and so is unaffected by e. Here, the ethic is 
allowed to affect Ri(9i, e) because the ordering represents the ethical concept of 
individual welfare rather than the positive concept of individual behaviour. An 
individual’s welfare ordering may change either because he changes or because the 
ethic changes. Indeed, ./?;(#/, e) may not be the preference ordering revealed by 
an individual’s behaviour because there may be no consistent revealed preference 
ordering at all. It may also differ because some revealed preferences are judged to 
be unethical — e.g., excessive intolerance for others. And it may differ because 
some revealed preferences are based on misinformation. In economic contexts, e 
determines any deviations from consumer sovereignty.
Let ~Ri(X) denote the set of all logically possible preference orderings on X  
which individual i could have; evidently R , ( X )  = 1Z(X). Then let R M( X )  = 
n,(=M R-i(X). An Arrow social welfare function (or ASWF) is then defined as a 
mapping /  : R M( X )  e-> R-(X) from the domain R M(X )  of all logically possible 
preference profiles R M =  (Ri)i^M over X  to the set R ( X )  of possible social 
preference orderings on X .  In the framework being used here, such an ASWF 




























































































and for some /  which must be independent of both 9M and e:
K { X  x 0 )  
P
(Ri(6i,e)) ieMn{x x e) -------------------- > n M(x)
R ( X  x 0 M)
R(6M,e)
TZ(X)
Note that, if an ASWF exists and the above Pareto rule is satisfied, then for 
any fixed society 6M £ 0 M, one must have
x P i ( e i , e ) y  (all i 6 M ) ==> x P (6M, e) y.
This is just the usual form of the weak Pareto condition.
Notice in particular how an ASWF can exist even when there is a fundamental 
welfare preference ordering R  £ TZ(X x 0); as Arrow (1963) explains, he origi­
nally wished to avoid interpersonal comparisons, and so an ASWF ignores all the 
information which /5(e) provides except the derived individual orderings R t(0t, e) 
(i £ M ) on X  (cf. Sen, 1977). In this sense, any ASWF is independent of all 
interpersonal comparisons, relevant or not.
4. Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Personal Comparisons
The condition which Arrow called “independence of irrelevant alternatives” 
(IIA) restricts even further the dependence of R (6M ,e)  upon 9M, and makes social 
choice independent of irrelevant personal comparisons. To express this and related 
conditions formally, it is convenient to introduce some further notation. First, 
given any binary relation Q on a set A, and given any subset B  of A, let Q b 
denote the restriction of Q to B,  which is defined for all pairs a, b £ A  by
a Q b  9 a, 4 € B  and a Q b.
Next, define the equivalence relation = g  between the two relations Q, Q' on A  by




























































































whenever B  is a subset of A. One can read Q = b  Q' as, UQ is equal on B  to Q' .n
Specifically, suppose that Z  is any subset of X \  then Z  is a (possible) set 
of relevant alternatives. Given Z, all other members of X  are irrelevant alterna­
tives. According to IIA, when Z  is the set of “relevant alternatives”, two societies 
0M G are regarded as equivalent if the individuals’ welfare orderings 
among the members of Z  are identical. According to the IIPC condition to be 
defined below, variations in the ethic e which leave these welfare orderings un­
changed are also irrelevant to the social welfare orderings of all pairs in Z. Thus 
only personal welfare comparisons concerning pairs within Z  are relevant; all other 
personal comparisons (and all interpersonal comparisons) are deemed to be irrel­
evant.
Formally, the ASWF /  : 7ZM(X )  i—> 'JZ(X) is said to satisfy independence 
of irrelevant personal comparisons (IIPC) provided that, for all pairs of societies 
qM rjM £ q M all pairs of ethics e, e1 G E , and all subsets Z  of AT, one has
R,(9„e)  = z  Ri(v i te') (all i e  M )  =► R(9M ,e) = z  R {vM,e').
So indeed individuals’ personal comparisons of relevant alternatives (in Z)  suffice 
to determine the social ordering on Z,  no matter what the ethic e may be. And the 
social ordering on Z  is unaffected by changes either in personal characteristics or 
in the ethic, as long as the individual welfare orderings of the relevant alternatives 
in Z  are unaffected.
Once again, the following commutative function diagram may help to explain 
this IIPC condition. It presumes the existence of an ASWF /  : 1ZM(X ) >—> 7Z(X). 
The condition IIPC requires that, for every subset Z C X , there must be a corre­
sponding restricted ASWF f z  '■ 7ZM(Z)  i—> R (Z )  relating the restrictions 7ZM(Z)  
and 7Z(Z)  of the individual preference profile and the social ordering respectively.
R z
n M( X )
f
R ( X )
10
7l M(Z)  




























































































Here, of course, R z  is used to denote the mapping whose value is the restriction 
to the set Z  of the ordering R  £ 1Z(X), and R % =  (Riz)ieM  is used to denote the 
mapping whose value is the profile of the restrictions R \z  of the individual welfare 
orderings R,.
Say that the ASWF /  : R M(X )  i-+ 7Z(X) satisfies the unrestricted domain 
condition (U) provided that, for each ethic e £ E,  each individual i £ M ,  and 
every logically possible preference ordering R £ 7Z(X), there exists at least one 
personal characteristic £ 0  such that Ri(6i,e) — R. Then we have:
T heorem  (A rrow ’s “im possibility” th eorem ). The three conditions (U), 
(IIPC) and (P) together imply the existence o f  a dictator d, whose identity is 
independent of  e, such that for every society , every ethic e, and every pair o f  
social states x, y £ X  one has
x Pd(9d,e) y = > x  P(0M,e) y.
The only novel feature of the above definition and result is the introduction of 
variations in the ethic e which are separate from variations in “individual values.” 
This extra feature actually requires that the above version of Arrow’s theorem be 
given a slightly new proof, since the standard proof only shows the existence of a 
dictator d(e) whose identity depends on e. Nevertheless, it is trivial to combine 
(IIPC), as enunciated above, with the unrestricted domain assumption (U) in order 
to show that d must in fact be independent of e.
Note how, in the absence of the Pareto criterion, the results of Hansson (1969) 
and Wilson (1972) imply that, when both (U) and (IIPC) are satisfied, then there 
are three possibilities: either (i) there is a dictator as above; or (ii) there is an 
“anti-dictator”; or (iii) there is universal social indifference between all pairs of 




























































































5. Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons
As remarked above, and as Arrow himself was of course well aware, the con­
struction of an ASWF specifically excludes interpersonal comparisons. This is 
because preferences regarding variations in 0 are entirely ignored when the society 
9m  is fixed. Moreover, when IIPC is imposed for any subset Z  of X , only indi­
viduals’ personal comparisons regarding pairs of alternatives in Z  are treated as 
relevant.
It is important to realize that IIPC forces us to ignore many preferences for 
relevant personal consequences, even when the society 0M is fixed. To support 
this claim, consider first the set
Q(9M) : = { r 1 e e \ 3 i e M :  9t = rj}
of all the personal characteristics that some individual in the society 6M possesses. 
Let Z  be the set of relevant social states. Then IIPC treats as relevant precisely the 
preferences between those pairs (x ,9 ) ,(y ,r]) 6 Z  x 0(6™) with the property that 
9 — rj — i.e., all personal comparisons. So all the personal consequences in the 
set Z  x Q(6m ) are relevant for some comparisons. But IIPC specifically excludes 
interpersonal comparisons of pairs with different characteristics 9j for different 
individuals i , j  £ M .  Independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons (IIIC), 
on the other hand, will treat the entire restricted fundamental interpersonal pref­
erence relation Rzx&(6M) as relevant. Indeed, it will say that the social ordering 
of relevant social consequences depends only on the ethical views which govern the 
fundamental ordering of the corresponding relevant personal consequences.
First, corresponding to any subset Y  of “relevant” social consequences in 
X  x 0 M, define each individual i ’s corresponding set of “relevant personal conse­
quences” as
Yi := { (x,i/) €  X  x 0  | 3( x , 6M) £ Y  : 9, = r, }.
Then define the set of all relevant personal consequences as




























































































Now say that independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons (IIIC) is sat­
isfied provided that, for every pair of ethics e, e' and every subset Y  of relevant 
social consequences in X  X 0 M, one has
P(e) = y  P(e') =4- p(e) = y  p(e').
Thus, as the ethic varies, the ordering of social consequences depends only on the 
ordering of relevant personal consequences. Notice how important it is to let the 
ethic vary; if e =  e' then both the hypothesis and the implication above become 
tautologies and so IIIC would have no force whatsoever if ethical views were fixed.
The condition IIIC requires that, for every Y  C X x Q M, the following diagram 
must commute:





n ( Ÿ )
4>y
R ( Y )
Indeed, this diagram shows clearly how IIIC is precisely that property of an SWF 
<j> : R ( X  x 0 )  i—> 7Z(X  x 0 M) which corresponds to property IIPC of an ASWF.
Take the special case when the society dM is fixed, so that the set of relevant 
social consequences is Y  Z  x {ffM} for some subset Z  of X ,  and the set of 
relevant personal consequences is Y  := Z  x  Q(8M). Then IIIC implies that
p(e) — Zx@(0M) p(e' )  = >  P(e) = Z x { 9" )  p(e')- *
From this and the earlier definition of the orderings R(ffM, e), R(0M, e') 6 TZ(X), 
it follows that IIIC reduces to the following condition, called IIIC(#M):




























































































6. Generalized Social Welfare Functions
So far, personal consequences have been defined as pairs ( x , 8) £ X  X 0 . An 
equivalent description for any given society 9M £ &M is simply the set X  x M  
of pairs (x , i ) ,  because then any 0M and (x ,i )  together determine the personal 
consequence (x , #,). This idea relates to the concept of a generalized social welfare 
function  (GSWF), defined as a mapping g : 1Z(X x M ) i-> 1Z(X), as in Hammond 
(1976) and Roberts (1980a).
Given the society 0M, the ethical views e, and the resulting fundamental 
ordering p(e) on X  X 0 , define the induced interpersonal ordering R(9M,e)  on 
X  x M  by.
(x , i )  R (0M,e) (y , j )  (x, 8t) p(e) (y, 6,).
Then the social welfare ordering p(e) on X  corresponds to such a GSWF if and 
only if, for all pairs of ethics e, e' £ E  and all pairs of societies 8M ,rjM £ 0 M, one 
has
R(0M,e) —x x M  R (v M,e') = >  R (8M,e) = x  R (gM,e').
When X  is replaced by any subset Z  of X  in the above implication, one has 
a GSWF which satisfies a condition which was called “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives” in Hammond (1976); it is a significant weakening of IIPC, however, 
and so I now prefer to say that generalized independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(GIIA) is satisfied provided that, for all e,e' £ E , all dM,r]M £ 0 M, and all 
subsets Z  of X ,  one has
R (8M,e) = ZxM R(r,M,e')  =► R (8M,e) = z  R(-?M,e').
This implies the existence of a restricted GSWF gz  : 7Z(Z x M ) *—> 7Z(Z). Both 
the existence of a GSWF and the condition GIIA are illustrated by the following 
commutative diagram, in which some obvious notation has been introduced in 





























































































H ( X  x 0 )
<t>
R (8M,e)
R ( X  x 0 M) ------------------» H (X )
R z x M




The following result shows how GIIA is a natural independence condition for 
GSWF’s because it is almost equivalent to IIIC(0M) for the corresponding SWF 
<t>: n ( X  x 0 )  «  n ( X  x 0 M).
THEOREM. (1) GIIA implies IIIC(dM ) lor every 9M. (2) Conversely, suppose that 
the domain E  o f possible ethics e places no restrictions on the domain of possible 
fundamental orderings R  =  /5(e) on X  x 0 .  In this case, i f  the social ordering 
R  =  p(8M ,e) in each fixed society 8M 6 QM can be derived from the fundamental 
ordering R  = p(e) through a GSWF g : R { X  x M )  i-> R ( X ) ,  and i f  IIIC(9M) is 
satisfied, then so is GIIA.
PROOF: (1) Suppose that Z  C X ,  that dM £  0 M, and that p(e) = zx © (0M) p(e')- 
Then, for all pairs (x, i), (y , j ) £ Z  X M , one has
(x , i )  R (8M,e) (y , j )  -*=► ( x , 8,) p(e) ( y , 8j)
(x,9i) p(e') (y,9j )  (x , i )  R(9M,e')  (y , j )
using the definitions of R(9M,e ) ,R (6M,e') and the above hypothesis. Therefore 
R{9M ,e) = z x M  R{9M,e'). From GIIA it follows that R(9M,e)  = z  R (8M,e'). So 
IIIC( 9M) has been verified.
(2) Conversely, suppose that R (8M, e) —Z xM R (j iM,e.'). Then, for all x, y £ Z  
and all i , j  6 M ,  one has
(x,8i) p(e) ( y ,8j )  (x , i )  R{6M ,e) {y , j )
<=$■ (x , i )  R(t]M,e') ( y , j )  <==> (x,rn) p(e') (y,r)j)
using the definitions of R(9M, e), R(r/M, e') and the above hypothesis.
By the unrestricted domain hypothesis, one can certainly construct an ethic 
e £ E  for which the associated fundamental ordering p(e) on X  x 0  satisfies




























































































for all x , y  £ X  and all i , j  £ M .  But this construction implies that R(9M, e) =  
R ( tjm  ,e'). Then, because of the hypothesis that a GSWF exists, it must be true 
that R(9M, e) =  R(r/M,e') and so that R{9M, e) = z  R(r M, e') in particular.
In addition, the above construction also ensures that
(x,9i) p(e) (y,9j)  •*=> (x,9i)  /5(e) (y,9j )
for all x , y  6 Z  and all i , j  6 M.  Therefore /5(e) =zx© (0M) P(e)> and so IIIC(#M) 
implies that R(9M ,e) = z  R{9M ,e).
The conclusions of the last two paragraphs imply that R(9M, e) = z  R( rl ^ \  e;), 
as required for GIIA to be valid. |
7. Random Consequences
Up to now attention has been restricted to preferences in the absence of risk. 
Vickrey (1945, 1960) and Harsanyi (1955) derived their form of utilitarianism from 
the need to consider risky consequences. And one obviously wants a theory of social 
choice that is applicable to decisions in the face of risk. Thus I shall consider the set 
A ( X  X 0 M) of simple probability measures on X  X &M —  i.e., discrete probability 
distributions which each attach probability one to some finite subset of X  x 0 M. 
Considering instead the space M ( X  X 0 M,A )  of general probability measures on 
some c-algebra A  over X  x  QM would merely add technical complications.
The set A (V  X QM) is a mixture space, in the sense of Herstein and Milnor 
(1953). For every ethic e € E,  the social welfare ordering p(e) is now defined on 
this mixture space, and the fundamental welfare ordering /5(e) is defined on the 
mixture space A (X  x 0 ) . The SWF becomes a mapping : R ( A ( X  x 0 ))  >-> 
1Z(A(X  X 0 M)), of course.
Without any further structure on preferences, there is little to add to the pre­
vious analysis — all that happens is that X  x 0 M , X  x  0  and their various subsets 
get replaced by (appropriate subsets of) A ( X  X 0 M) or A (X  x 0 ). For example, 
given any simple probability measure A £ A (X  x 0 M) and any individual i 6 M ,  




























































































which is induced by A on i ’s personal consequences (z, 8i). Thus 
\ i { x , 6i) := gQ _ A( x , 8t , 6_i)
where Q -i  denotes the Cartesian product space n^AAf»} @7 °f Pr°files of other 
individuals’ characteristics, with typical member Then the Pareto condition 
(P) takes the form:
A; P(e) /.lì (all i G M ) =>  A P(e) //.
The definitions of IIPC, IIIC and l l lC(0M) can easily be extended in order to 
accommodate such random consequences. First, say that extended independence of 
irrelevant personal comparisons (EIIPC) is satisfied provided that, for all subsets 
Z  C A(.X’), all societies 0M G 0 M, and all pairs of ethics e,e' G E , one has
Ri(8i,e) =z  Ri(Vi,e')  (all i 6 M )  = »  R(8M,e) = z  R{
This EIIPC condition may be easier to understand with the aid of the follow­
ing commutative function diagram, whose construction presumes the existence of 
an ASWF for lotteries or random consequences of the form /  : 1ZM( A (X ) )  ►-» 
1Z(A(X)). Then EIIPC requires that, for every subset Z  C X ,  there is a restricted 
ASWF fz  : n M{Z) H-t n ( Z ) ,  as shown below:
r m (A {X ))  — n M(Z)
f




Before the two conditions EIIIC and EIIIC(#M) can be described properly, a 
little more notation is needed. Given any set A C A ( X  X 0 M) of random social 
consequences, define for each individual i £ M  the corresponding set
A; := { Aj e  A ( X  x 0 )  | 3A £ A : A; =  marg xx@i A }
of marginal distributions on i ’s personal consequences. Then let A := UjgM Ai be 




























































































say that extended independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons (EIIIC) is 
satisfied provided that, for all such subsets A C A ( X  x ©M) and all pairs of ethics 
e, e' G E , one has
P(e ) = a £ (e')  =►  f>(e ) =A P(e').
This can be illustrated as follows:
R ( A ( X  x 0 ))






Next, for any fixed society e  0 M, one obviously says that EIIIC(#M) is 
satisfied provided that
p(e) =Sx{««) p(e') ==> R (8M,e) =3 R (8m , e')
for all subsets S  C A ( X  ) and all pairs of ethics e, e' £ E.  Evidently EIIIC implies 
that EIIIC(#m) is true for all fixed societies 9M 6 0 M.
The two conditions EIIIC and EIIIC(#m) are natural extensions of the earlier 
independence conditions IIIC and IIIC(f?M) for sure consequences. In fact, though, 
IIIC(#A?) — which is the weakest of all the four conditions IIIC, IIIC(#M), EIIIC 
and EIIIC(#m) — will be strong enough to establish the impossibility theorem of 
Section 8. Accordingly the extended conditions EIIIC and EIIIC(0M) which were 




























































































8. Harsanyi’s Expected Utilitarianism
Following Herstein and Milnor’s (1953) familiar axioms, I shall now assume 
that, for each ethic e £ E,  the corresponding social welfare ordering R  =  p(e) on 
A ( X  x 0 M) satisfies the two conditions:
(i) Probability Independence. If A ,/i,i/ £ A (X  x 0 M) and 0 < a  < 1, then
aA +  (1 -  a )u  R  a  p, + (1 — a) v  •£=> A R  p.
(ii) Weak Continuity. For any A,/j, i/ £  A ( X  x 0 M), the two sets
{ a  | 0 <  a  <  1 and oA  +  ( l - « ) ( i  R  v }
{ a | 0 < a  < 1 and v R  a \  + (1 — a) p ]  
axe always closed subsets of the real line interval [0,1].
These two conditions imply that for every e there exists a unique cardinal equiv­
alence class of von Neumann-Morgenstern social welfare functions  (NMSWF’s) 
u;(-,-;e) : X  x QM ►-» 3t such that, for every pair A,/r e  A (X  x 0 M), one has
A p(e) p. <!=f TEx w (x ,0 M-,e)>TEtlw (x ,9 M-e).
Here E a denotes expected value with respect to A, and E^ similarly.
Next, the space of personal consequences is similarly extended to the space 
A (X  x 0 )  of simple probability measures on X  x 0 , and the fundamental welfare 
ordering R  =  /5(e) on this space is also assumed to satisfy the Herstein and Milnor 
axioms for every e E f .  So there is a cardinal equivalence class of fundamental 
von Neumann-Morgenstern welfare functions (NMWF’s) «(-,-; e) : A  x 0  m  S  
such that, for every pair A,p £ A ( X  x 0 ) , one has
A p(e) n •*=> Ex t)(r, 5; e) > E p t i ( i , e ) .
For every e, the NMWF v is unique up to a cardinal equivalence class of functions 
which result from increasing linear transformations of the form




























































































where both a(e) and /3(e) are independent of 6, with a(e) positive. Thus ?;(•,•; e) 
embodies interpersonal comparisons of both utility levels and utility units — what 
Roberts (1980b) calls “cardinal full comparability.”
Assume that the Pareto condition (P) of Section 6 is supplemented by the 
Pareto indifference condition (P°)
\ i  I  fii (all i G M)  =>■ A I  fi,
where I  and I  are the indifference relations generated respectively by the fun­
damental and social welfare orderings /3(e) and p(e). Then, as Harsanyi (1955) 
originally argued, for every ethic e E f ,  the corresponding NMSWF w(-,-;e) — 
whose expected value represents the social ordering p(e) on the set A ( X  x ©M) 
— must be a non-negatively weighted sum
w (x ,0M;e) = Y l ieM “ >(e) v(M «;e)
of the values v ( x ,6i\e)  of the fundamental NMWF whose expectation represents 
/5(e) G 1Z(A(X  x 0 )) . Actually, Harsanyi did not consider variations in 0M, but 
this makes no difference to the conclusion — see Hammond (1987). Notice too 
that the “welfare weights” uJi(e) are allowed to reflect varying ethical views, as 
is the fundamental NMWF v(-,-;e). Also the Pareto condition (P) implies that
Eie/w  w«(e) > 0-
9. Another Impossibility Theorem
Suppose that the welfare weighted sum EtgM UJi(e) v (x i ^ i \ e) does not give 
rise to a dictatorship. In other words, suppose that there is no fixed individual 
d e  M ,  independent of e, for whom uij(e) > 0 only if i =  d. Then there must exist 
at least two different individuals j , t  6  M  and two (possibly coincident) ethics 
e,e' 6 E  for which ojj(e) and wt(e') are both positive.
Consider now what happens when Z  consists of just the pair x ,y  of sure 




























































































sufficiently rich provided that there exist two more ethics ei, e2 £ E,  three personal 
characteristics 9,9',0"  £ 0 , and a large real number K  > 1, which together satisfy:
(i) u^(ei) > 0 and u;*(e2) > 0;
(ii) for both the fundamental welfare orderings R  = p ( t \ )  and R  =  p(e2), one has
M )  I  (y,9) P  P  P  (y,8") P  (* ,« " ) ;
(iii) for all z £ { x , y  } and 8 £ { 8,9' , 9" }, one has
v(z ,9;e2) = min { v ( z ,8;e i)  -  v (y ,d" ,e1), K [v(z ,0;e i)  -  v (y ,9";e i)] };
(iv) Wj(ei) [v(x,8’;ei) -  v(y,0' ;e i)] >  Uj(ei )[v(y ,0",e i) -  v (x , 9" ;e i)].
The idea here is that the ethic should be able to vary sufficiently from both e 
and e' in order to satisfy (ii), (iii) and (iv), while the welfare weights still satisfy 
(i). In particular, this requires some independence in the possible variations of the 
welfare weights and of the fundamental NMWF which is defined on X  x 0 .
Let 8M be the society with 8j = 8', 8k =  8", and 8i =  8 otherwise. By (ii) 
and (iii), one has
v(x ,9 ';e2) -  v (y ,8'-,e2) = v ( x , 8' \ e1) -  v (y ,8' ;e i)  > 0; 
v ( x , 8";e2) -  v (y ,8";e2) =  K  [u(x, 8"\e i)  -  v (y ,8"-,ei)] < 0.
So, if K  > 1 is large enough, then
(v) uij(e2)[v(x,8' ;e2) -  v(y,8' ;e2)\ < u>t (e2) [u(t/, 8"; e2) -  v(x,  9"; e2)].
Then (ii) implies that, for q = 1 and 2,
w(x,  8M;eq) ~  w{y, 8M; e,) =  w; (e ,) [w(x, 9'-e,) -  v (y , 8'; e,)]
+  K*> <?"; e,) -  v ( y , 8"-e,)].
When 5 =  1 this expression is positive, by (iv), but when q = 2 it is negative, by 
(v). So x P(0M ,e i)  y and y P(9M,e2) x. This violates the condition IIIC(#M) 
because, when Y  = { x , y  } x { 8 M} and therefore Y  = { x , y  } x { 8 ,9', 8" }, it follows 




























































































The above argument confirms that, at least when the domain E  of possible 
ethics allows sufficient independent variations of the welfare weights u>;(e) (i £ M ) 
and of the fundamental NMWF u(-,-;e), then nonlinear transformations of the 
form which appears in (iii) above will only preserve the ordering generated by 
E  X/ieM u i(e) v(x >@ii e) when there is a dictator. Thus:
PROPOSITION. Suppose that IIIC(6M) is satisfied, for every society dM £ 0 M 
and that the set of ethics E  gives rise to a sufficiently rich domain o f  possible 
fundamental interpersonal orderings p(e) £ 1Z(A(X  x 0 )) . Suppose too that 
the expected utility hypotheses and the two Pareto conditions (P) and (P°) are 
satisfied. Then there exists a dictator d whose identity is independent o f  e.
This result says that only a dictatorship succeeds in making the following 
function diagram commute for every society $M £ QM and subset Z  C X .  The 
diagram uses the notation 7?*(A(5)) to denote the set of all preference orderings 
on A (5) which can be represented by the expected value of any member of a 
unique cardinal equivalence class of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. 
In addition, [u>] and [u] each denote such an equivalence class representing respec­
tively the social welfare ordering p(e) £ 7J*(A(X X 0 M)) and the fundamental 
welfare ordering p(e) £ 1Z*(A(X x 0 )).
i M zx©(#m)
1Z*(A(X  x 0 ))  -------- > 1Z*(A(X x 0 ))  ------------------ * TZ(Z x O(0M))
U (Z  x {0M})
'
M <t>
M , ,  M  Z x { « " )




























































































10. Independence of Irrelevant Interpersonal Comparisons of Mixtures
The following weakening of IIIC proves useful in avoiding the dictatorship to 
which it leads when consequences are risky. Say that independence of irrelevant 
interpersonal comparisons of mixtures (IIICM) is satisfied provided that, for every 
subset Y  of social consequences (x ,9 M) G X  x 0 M with an assocated set Y  of 
personal consequences (x , 6) 6 X  x 0 , and for each pair of ethics e,e' G E,  one 
has
P(e) =A(Y) p(e') ==> P(e) =Y p(e')-
Like our previous independence conditions, this one can also be illustrated with a 
commutative function diagram, as follows:
H * (A (X  x &))
E
7?*(A(X x 0 ))
4>






Thus preferences for risky relevant personal consequences count even though Y  
contains only sure social consequences. This may seem peculiar, but appears 
to be the only way of extending rational Paretian social choice to cover risky 
consequences without having a dictatorship.
Notice that IIICM is indeed satisfied when p(e) is represented on X  x Q M by 
w (x ,d M;e) =
as in Section 8, except that now n>i is independent of e. For when Y  has at least 
two members and p(e) = A(y) p(e')> it follows that the two NMWF’s v(x,d;e) 
and v ( x ,6\e')  are cardinally equivalent on Y . That is, there exists a positive 
multiplicative constant a and an additive constant f) such that




























































































for all (x, 6) E Y.  Thus
*(*>eM’e' ) s  E i6M ”(*’ e,) = a E i6M w« e) +  /* E , 6M
= au,(i>eM;e)+/3E ieMu'i
for all ( x , 6m ) E E. Therefore e) and ta(-,-;e') are cardinally equivalent
on Y , and so not only represent identical preferences on this set, but also have 
expected values representing identical preferences on the mixture set A (F ). A sim­
ilar argument then shows that when IIICM is extended to random consequences, 
as IIIC was in Section 7, the corresponding extended condition EIIICM is also 
satisfied.
Of course, one can also insist upon anonymity, so that u>i =  ui (all i 6 M )  
where u  > 0. Then, after a harmless normalization, the expected value of the sum
w(x ,6M-,e) = v(x ’S‘<e)
represents p(e) on A (X  x QM).
11. Independence of Irrelevant Personal Comparisons of Mixtures
So IIICM does allow an escape from the dictatorship of Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem to a form of expected utilitarianism along the lines pioneered by Vickrey 
and Harsanyi. IIICM differs from IIPC in allowing both interpersonal comparisons 
and preferences for risky consequences to become relevant. Section 9 showed how 
just introducing interpersonal comparability through the IIIC condition is not 
enough by itself to avoid dictatorship — preferences for risky consequences must 
be considered as well. The question still remains whether allowing just dependence 
on preferences for risky consequences, without interpersonal comparisons, could 
do the same. In fact it does not, which should come as no suprise in view of Sen’s 
(1970a) version of Arrow’s theorem for cardinal utilities (see also Osborne, 1976).
Actually, an even stronger statement is possible. Even when interpersonal 
comparisons are not relevant, say that “independence of irrelevant personal com­




























































































of sure social states, every pair of societies 0M,rjM E 0M , and every pair of ethics 
e, e' E E,  it is true that
Ri(0i,e)  = A(Z) Ri(tji,e') (all i £ M ) => R(6M,e) = z  R(r,M,e').
Thus the hypothesis of IIPCM is stronger than that of IIPC because it requires 
the preference profiles to be identical for all lotteries in the mixture set A (Z),  
rather than just for all sure social states in Z. Accordingly, IIPCM is superficially 
a less restrictive condition than IIPC. Yet in fact it turns out to be equivalent 
when preferences for risky consequences can be represented by the expected value 
of a unique cardinal equivalence class of utility functions.
To show this equivalence, suppose that IIPCM is satisfied, and then consider 
any pair set Z — { x, y } C X  of sure social states. Now, if x P,(Si , e) y for any 
individual i £ M, characteristic 9i £ 0 ,  and ethic e £ E,  it must be true that, for 
any pair of lotteries Ax  +  (1 — A)y and f i x  + (1 — f i )y in A (Z),  one has
A i  + (1 — A) y Pi(8i,e) f ix  + (1 — f i )y  A >  fi.
On the other hand, if y P,(6,.e) x.  then it must be true that
A x +  (1 — A) y Pi(6{, e) f i  x + (1 — f i )  y <=> A <  f i
for any such pair. While if x e) y, then for all such pairs it must be true that 
A x  -f  (1 — A) y 1,(6,, e) fi x  +  (1 — fi) y, no matter what values A and fi may have in 
the interval [0,1]. Thus the preference ordering R,(6i, e) on the mixture set A (Z)  
is completely determined by preferences over just the two extreme points in the 
pair set Z.
Given the two profiles of characteristics 6M,ifM 6 0M, and the pair of ethics 
e,e' £ E,  suppose it is true that R.,(6,, e) = z  R,(y,, P)  for all i £  M , as in the 
hypothesis of IIPC for the pair set Z. Then the argument of the previous paragraph 
shows that Ri(6i,e) = A (Z) Ri(Vi<e') f°r all t £ M,  which is the hypothesis of 




























































































Thus, for an arbitrary pair set Z  C X , it has been shown that
Ri(0i,e) = z  R ,(vi,e ')  (all i € M )  =>• R{9M ,e) = z R(r,M,e'), 
or that IIPC is true for this pair set.
To complete the argument requires noting that, if IIPC holds for every pair 
set, then it must be true for every subset Z  C X . But this is well known and easy 
to show (see, for instance, d’Aspremont and Gevers, 1977).
Merely cardinalizing utilities, therefore, does nothing at all to weaken the 
IIPC condition. Interpersonal comparisons must also be allowed, as in the IIICM 
condition of Section 10.
12. Concluding Summary
Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA) condition — or, more 
precisely, the new but closely related “independence of irrelevant personal compar­
isons” (IIPC) condition of Section 4, which was designed to allow variable ethical 
views — has been modified in order to allow interpersonal comparisons to affect 
the social ordering. Section 5 presented a weakened “independence of irrelevant 
interpersonal comparisons” (IIIC) condition which recognized that both IIA and 
IIPC exclude interpersonal comparisons of relevant personal consequences.
In Section 9 IIIC was shown to lead rather easily to a dictatorship when 
random consequences are considered. Accordingly a specific weakening to allow 
consideration of preferences for random personal consequences was introduced in 
Section 10. This new “independence of irrelevant interpersonal comparisons of 
mixtures” (IIICM) condition was then shown to be consistent with Harsanyi’s 
fundamental utilitarianism (cf. Hammond, 1987). Later, in Section 11, it was 
shown how the corresponding weakening for IIPC (without interpersonal compar­
isons being allowed to count) would make no difference. Indeed, in retrospect, this 
need to consider probability mixtures should not be too surprising, since that is 
how utilities are cardinalized. On its own, IIIC allows only ordinal utilities, and so 




























































































on the other hand, enables random social states to be ordered according to an 
expected utillity maximizing criterion.
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